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THE ROLE OF IDEAS IN LEGAL HISTORY 
Jay M. Feinman*t 
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT. By G. Edward 
White. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Publishing Co. 1978. Pp. xix, 
384. $14.50. 
During the past decade Professor G. Edward White has been 
among the most industrious tillers of the legal history vineyard. In 
Patterns of American Legal Thought he has gathered ten of his essays 
and organized them into thematic areas. The effort may seem pre-
sumptuous - publishing collected essays is an activity usually re-
served for senior scholars - but the explosion of interest in legal 
history is so recent that White has achieved a measure of seniority at 
a relatively young age. Although the collection may not be neces-
sary, it is convenient; several of the articles have been widely used 
and will now be more readily available. Moreover, the collection 
interestingly demonstrates the approach and growth of one scholar 
and raises (but does not answer) significant issues for legal historiog-
raphy and, ultimately, for the legal system itself. 
The essays in Patterns are organized to develop three themes in 
American law and legal history: (I) the importance of scholarly 
thought in shaping the course of substantive law; (2) the preeminent 
position of the judiciary; and (3) the significance of the Constitution 
and its exegesis by the Supreme Court. The themes represent 
White's research interests but do not pretend to define the scope of 
American legal history. Indeed, White seeks to compensate for what 
he sees as the dominance of economic and pluralist explanations of 
American law (pp. 16-17), just as those approaches sought to com-
pensate for the almost exclusive study of the Supreme Court and 
aspects of technical doctrine. The limitation of scope is admirable, 
of course, though it makes this a more difficult book to review. Nev-
ertheless, implicit in White's approach are propositions about histor-
ical causation and legal process. After reviewing briefly White's 
three themes I identify and comment on the most important of these 
propositions and describe an alternative set of propositions that I 
find more satisfying. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. B.A. 1972, 
American University; J.D. 1975, University of Chicago.-Ed. 
t I am grateful to Rand Rosenblatt for co=enting on a draft of this review. 
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I. THE PA ITERNS 
A. Scholarly Thought 
723 
White's principal field of interest is the intellectual history of 
American law. Three essays in Patterns explore the role of scholarly 
thought in two areas - twentieth century jurisprudence and the rise 
of tort law in the nineteenth century. As White acknowledges in his 
introduction, his conceptual approach changed between his earlier 
writings on the twentieth century and his current work on the origins 
of torts. White's earlier approach described a direct causal link be-
tween social phenomena and schools of jurisprudence, while his 
more recent work concedes the "extraordinarily complex and diffi-
cult to characterize" link between events and ideas (p. 97). 
In two major essays originally published in the Virginia Law Re-
view, I White traces the development of schools of American juris-
prudence in the twentieth century and explores that development's 
origins in political phenomena. The dialectical evolution of schools 
of jurisprudence is a familiar tale today, in part because of White's 
work. The rigid, syllogistic analysis known as Mechanical Jurispru-
dence dominated legal thought at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Roscoe Pound elevated Holmes's critique of that school to the status 
of a new jurisprudential movement, which he dubbed "Sociological 
Jurisprudence" in 1907. Sociological Jurisprudence moved legal 
study away from pure technical analysis by incorporating the in-
sights of the social sciences. By the time the move was firmly under-
way, however, the social sciences had shifted into new areas, notably 
behavioral studies. The legal scholars who adopted the new ap-
proach mounted an attack on Sociological Jurisprudence and cre-
ated a new dominant school: American Legal Realism. By World 
War II, in tum, the moral relativism of Realism was itself a point of 
weakness, and a renewed emphasis on affirming underlying values 
and institutional competence gave rise to Process Jurisprudence,2 
which would itself prove inadequate under the extraordinary pres-
sures of the 1960s and the activism of the Warren Court. 
According to White's account, the principal impetuses for the rise 
and fall of the successive jurisprudential movements lay outside the 
legal system, in political movements and events and in trends among 
American intellectuals. For example, Pound's Sociological Jurispru-
dence reflected two social hypotheses of Progressivism: the need for 
continuity in change and the utility of law in explicating shared so-
I. White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in 
Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972); White, The Evolution of Rea-
soned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 297 (1973). 
2. In this essay White deals primarily with Reasoned Elaboration, a school of Supreme 
Court criticism which is "a particular canon" of Process Jurisprudence. G. WHITE, THE 
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 404 n.2 (1976). 
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cial values. As the optimism of the Progressive movement faded in 
the 1920s and the attention of Progressive social scientists shifted to 
the study of the human and national psyches, Sociological Jurispru-
dence was challenged by Realism,, a school reflective of the newer 
way of perceiving reality. White describes the social phenomena as 
directly generating approaches to social theory, including ap-
proaches to legal theory. 
White's later essay on the origins of torts3 presents a more com-
plex picture of the interaction between social practice and law. As 
the traditional view has it, the law of negligence developed to deal 
with accident litigation in a newly industrialized economy without 
unduly burdening emergent industry.4 White regards the rise of the 
new type of accident as crucial, but only as grist for the intellectual 
mill of legal thinkers coincident with other developments in law and 
social thought. 
Injury as a product of industrialization changed the typical tort 
case from one between persons in a close relation to each other to 
one between strangers. Suits between strangers encouraged a shift in 
the basis of liability from a specific unperformed duty to violation of 
a generalized standard of care. Violating such a standard of care 
was called negligence and became the basis for the tort cause of ac-
tion. 
But courts did not develop and adopt the negligence principle 
merely in response to the novelty of suits between strangers. Courts 
and scholars were attempting to develop broad principles of law for 
two other reasons. The first was internal; the demise of the writ sys-
tem required not only procedural change but also a fundamental re-
orientation of legal thinking. While the writ system existed, it 
provided the law's conceptual basis; with its collapse, a new intellec-
tual foundation, based on principles of substantive doctrine, had to 
be found. Negligence offered an organizing principle for the law of 
private wrongs. The second impetus to doctrinal organization came 
from the larger intellectual climate. Victorian intellectuals, recogniz-
ing the socially disintegrative capacity of material progress, strove to 
articulate general scientific principles with which to order the chaotic 
social universe. Legal scholars joined in the effort within their area 
of expertise, and two of those most taken with the conceptualist ap-
proach, Holmes and Nicholas St.John Green, made major contribu-
tions to the. development of torts as a unified field. 
White's methodological emphasis in recounting the rise of tort 
3. White, The Intellectual Origins oJ Torts in America, 88 YALE L.J. 671 (1977) (p. 163). 
This article has been supplemented by a later article, White, The Impact oJ Legal Science on 
Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 213 (1978), and apparently both have been super-
seded by White's new book on the subject, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HIS-
TORY (1980), which I have not considered for the purpose of this review. 
4. E.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 261-64, 409-17 (1973). 
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law differs from his approach in discussing twentieth century juris-
prudence, which he saw as a reflection of political and social events. 
In describing the rise of tort law, White portrays a much more com-
plicated causal relation_. Social and economic events provide the raw 
material for the legal system, but the raw material is shaped by intel-
lectual conditions of the time. Describing the historical process be-
comes more difficult when a simple chain of causation is abandoned. 
In attempting to resolve the problem of causation in legal history 
White first emphasizes scholarly thought. He then proceeds to con-
sider the preeminent position of the judiciary and the significance of 
constitutional principles. 
B. The Judiciary 
The two essays in White's chapter on the judiciary and the intro-
ductory chapter's essay on judicial opinions as historical sources are 
suggestive, but they lack the thematic unity of the chapter on legal 
scholarship. Each essay presents a different facet of the judicial role. 
In ''The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes,"5 an essay closely related 
to the materials on scholarly thought, White describes the changes in 
intellectual and popular regard for the venerable Justice. In the es-
say on Brandeis's influences on administrative law,6 White deals 
more directly with the extent of judicial influence on American law 
and raises again the problem of historical causation. His essay on 
judicial opinions7 summarizes his general thoughts on the judicial 
role and its position in the model of causation. Since White has writ-
ten extensively on "the American judicial tradition" in his book of 
that name,8 Patterns cannot adequately express White's views on the 
judiciary without duplicating his other work. These three essays 
merely underscore his "conviction that significant contributions to 
American legal thought have been made by holders of judgeships, 
particularly at the appellate levels" (p. 193). That prosaic belief 
hardly seems worth the space devoted to it, but the essays are inter-
esting nevertheless. 
Justice Holmes is perhaps the outstanding figure in American le-
gal history. White examines the public and professional regard for 
Holm.es as Boston Brahmin, as ideologue, and as judicial stylist, 
from his emergence as a preeminent thinker with the publication of 
The Common Law in 1881 to the present. The essay is only in minor 
part about Holmes, drawing the familiar complex, somewhat" pa-
5. 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 51 (1971) (p. 194). 
6. White, A/localing Power Between Agencies and Courts: The Legacy of Justice Brandeis, 
1974 DUKE L.J. 195. 
7. White, The Appellate Opinion as Historical Source Material, 1 J. INTERDIS. HIST. 491 
(1971) (p. 74). 
8. THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 2. 
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thetic picture of intellectual radical turned proto-nihilist.9 It is also 
only incidentally about the judiciary; Holmes achieved his impor-
tance because he served in important judicial positions, but by itself 
that is hardly a point of great significance. The essay mostly comple-
ments White's work on twentieth century jurisprudence, describing 
the changing perception of Holmes by successive groups of intellec-
tuals. It conveys a general impression similar to that left from the 
essays on scholarly thought: that political and social events shape 
intellectual paradigms, and those paradigms then organize social 
and historical reality for their adherents. Thus each successive 
school found in Holmes the positive or negative characteristics that 
best confirmed its belief structure. 
Justice Brandeis receives more direct treatment in the essay dis-
cussing the influence of his opinions in shaping the field of adminis-
trative law. The article adds to White's methodological calculus the 
role important judges play in shaping the law. By the time of Bran-
deis's appointment to the Supreme Court in 1916, a comprehensive 
scheme of governmental regulation of industrial and financial activ-
ity had been put in place, but there remained to be developed a body 
of law that would define the limits of agency power and the role of 
legislative delegation and judicial supervision. White suggests that 
Brandeis directed administrative law toward the allocative approach, 
which emphasizes the distribution of power between agencies and 
courts, rather than the approach of the creators of the administrative 
system, which emphasized the issues of delegation and national uni-
formity. 
In terms of historical causation, White perceives Brandeis as act-
ing in an authoritative but scholarly role. Brandeis did not, by 
strength of conviction or logic, single-handedly shape the develop-
ment of administrative law. His legal views, growing out of his polit-
ical orientation, became persuasive to his Supreme Court colleagues 
and others in large part because of the evolving contemporary expe-
rience with administrative bodies. By historical coincidence Bran-
deis was in a position of authority when his analysis was regarded as 
helpful in deciding issues arising out of a new reality. So the judge's 
role, like the scholar's, is to present a perceptual framework in which 
to organize social experience, though at times the judge may be more 
successful in doing so because of the greater authority of his opin-
ions.10 
White's essay on judicial opinions as historical sources pictures 
9. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 48-50 (1977). 
10. The perceptual framework is important but not determinative. Political, economic, 
and social phenomena were primarily responsible for the rise of the administrative state; judi-
cial opinions had only a limited effect on the governmental response to these phenomena, See 
notes_ 25-31 infra and accompanying text. 
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judges as subject to institutional and role constraints but able to ex-
press their political and social inclinations. Thus he suggests a his-
torical method that first identifies a judicial ratiocinative style 
common to a period and then correlates the style and its social as-
sumptions with modes of discourse in other disciplines, values of po-
litical and social movements, and prevailing cultural attitudes. 
White illustrates the method with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 11 
Justice Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson reflected the Progressive 
ideal of social reform with institutional continuity; the opinion 
changed the law of manufacturers' liability by purporting to recon-
cile, not overrule, precedents. Again, White describes legal thought 
as mirroring social and intellectual trends within the limits of the 
judicial office.12 ~ 
C. The Constitution 
White's chapter on the judiciary is less thematically coherent 
than his chapter on scholarly thought; the final chapter, on the Con-
stitution, is less coherent still. The chapter consists of two articles, 
neither of ":'hich fulfills the Introduction's promise to discuss how 
the presence of a written fundamental law has distinguished the 
character of American law. The first essay, 13 a review of Richard 
Kluger's Simple Justice, 14 discusses the interaction between the 
Supreme Court and its publics, at least attempting to examine the 
complexity of legal process. The second piece, "Constitutional Pro-
tection for Personal Lifestyles"15 (with J. Harvie Wilkinson, III), is a 
traditional, nonhistorical case analysis that seems to have been in-
cluded simply to fill out the volume. It no more lends itself to histor-
ical discussion than any other representative of its genre. 16 
Together the two essays speak little about the significance· of a 
written constitution. They do, however, remind us of familiar points 
about the Supreme Court's social role in proclaiming constitutional 
law. Let me summarize three points: 
(1) The public perceives three divergent roles of the Supreme 
Court: The Court as "nine people," as "a branch of government," 
and as "the supreme law of the land" (p. 292). To maintain the va-
lidity of the higher roles and thereby to avoid the charge of arbitrari-
11. 217 N.Y. 382 (1916). 
12. The interaction of institutional constraints and social ideology in shaping judicial deci-
sions is emphasized by White in THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 2. 
13. White, The Supreme Court's Public and the Public's Supreme Court, 52 VA. Q. REv. 370 
(1976) (p. 290). 
14. R. KI.UGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975). 
15. 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977) (p. 308). 
16. For an analysis of the genre, see Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An 
Interpretation oJ Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEXAS L. REv. 1307 (1979). 
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ness, the Court must establish its legitimacy as a governing 
institution through the appearance of institutional continuity. To ac-
complish this, the Court primarily relies on adherence, real or pro-
fessed, to a system of stare decisis and on appeals to fundamental 
values. The tension between roles is most acute when the Court 
overrules a precedent (as in Brown v. Board of Education 11) or when 
it renders a decision not based on a specific constitutional protection 
(as in many of the "lifestyle" decisions. 18) 
(2) Decisions of the Court both shape and are shaped by con-
temporary social values. The causal chain is very complicated. By 
selecting the cases it hears and decides, and by choosing to express 
its opinions in those cases broadly or narrowly, the Court has some 
control over the extent of its influence on social values. But the 
Court cannot render decisions that stray too far from widely held 
values; White and Wilkinson note that this fact limits the Court's 
power to protect individual freedom of lifestyle. Still, the Court's 
decisions may, as in Brown, lead public opinion and encourage cer-
tain values. 
(3) The Supreme Court has three publics: the profession, the 
informed public, and the laity. In writing opinions (or attacking 
opinions in dissent) Justices must speak at different levels to reach 
different publics. With rare exceptions, of which Brown may be the 
most exceptional, Supreme Court decisions do not penetrate deeply 
into the public consciousness. When one does, the lay public and 
much of the informed public are probably aware only of the results 
and not the reasoning in the opinion. Thus the Court can play only 
a limited role in developing social values. 
IL IDEAS AND THE PROBLEM OF CAUSATION 
Patterns is not a book that needed to be published. As an anthol-
ogy, it cannot provide a unified discussion of important aspects of 
American law; indeed, two of its three thematic chapters do no more 
than suggest the contours of their basic themes. Nevertheless, the 
work has an underlying motif; the problem of causation in legal his-
tory and, especially, ideas as causal or caused factors. This motif 
guides White's quest for an alternative to the dominant characteriza-
tion of legal study as the study of the "law's operational significance 
for the institution of the market."19 The effort to penetrate the prob-
lem of causation is important, for the problem is necessarily essential 
to any explanation of history. And White is not alone among his-
torians in urging renewed attention to the role of ideas in the causal 
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
18. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967). 
19. Seep. xviii (citing Hurst, The Law in United States History, 104 PROC. AM. PHIL, Soc. 
518, 523 (1960)). 
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chain; a large number of scholars arrayed all along the political spec-
trum have increasingly emphasized the importance of the legal sys-
tem's intellectual aspects for resolving historical and contemporary 
problems. · 
Patterns presents three aspects of the role of ideas: the signifi-
cance of nonauthoritative intellectual l~ders, the significance of 
judges, and the significance of a unique body of justices responsible 
for interpreting a set of universal principles. The underlying issue is 
where each of these groups fits in the causal nexus that involves eco-
nomic, political, and social forces; the public, elite groups, and the 
legal profession; and schools and principles of legal thought and as-
pects of technical legal doctrine. A growing body of literature ex-
plicitly addresses this issue, and it is implicitly explored in every 
major piece of writing on legal history and the legal system. This is 
not the place for a comprehensive survey of the various approaches 
to the issue. I think it would be helpful, however, to discuss some 
general approaches to the issue, to locate White's thinking within 
those approaches, to suggest some of the implications of each ap-
proach, and finally to comment on the validity of each approach 
and, therefore, on the contribution of Patterns: 
We can identify two schools ·of thought on the causal position of 
ideas. 20 Adherents of the orthodox approach to law and legal his-
tory21 regard ideas as primary in legal causation. Accordingly, 
scholars and judges, as the developers of legal ideas, are the key to 
legal causation. In this view, social reality is important only in pro-
viding the material that the legal system will shape. Historically this 
idealist school has taken two basic forms, one concerning itself only 
with autonomous, professional legal activity and the other emphasiz-
ing the functional role of law in shaping social behavior. 
The second approach to the causal role of ideas contrasts strongly 
with functionalist idealism. If law is interrelated with social practice, 
then perhaps social practice is prior to law and not vice versa. Then 
legal form and content would largely reflect external forces in soci-
ety, the origins of legal ideas could be identified outside the legal 
system, and the actions of scholars and judges would have little in-
dependent significance. A common form of this perspective is eco-
nomic determinism, the belief that economic forces are directly 
20. See Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in Ameri-
can Legal Historiography, IO L. & SocY. REv. 9 (1975); Tushnet, Perspectives on the .Develop-
ment of American Law: A Critical Review of Lawrence Friedman's •~ History of American 
Law" 1977 Wis. L. REv. 81; Gordon, Some Thoughts on Legal Form and Social Practice in 
American Legal Historiography (unpublished paper presented at the Second National Meeting, 
Conference on Critical Legal Studies, Nov. I I, 1978); Holt, Morton Horw,~z and the Tranefor-
mation of American Legal History (1979) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Michigan 
Law Review). 
21. See Gordon, supra note 20; Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of Amer-
ican Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275 (1973). 
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correlated to legal practice. Economic determinism has a liberal va-
riant, pluralist determinism, and a radical variant, quaintly called 
vulgar instrumental Marxism. 
This description of idealism and determinism, two major ap-
proaches to the role of ideas in legal history, encompasses crudely 
but not too inaccurately much of the typical work in the discipline 
until the recent resurgence of activity. Presently the discipline is 
characterized by a diversity of fresh approaches to the issue of his-
torical causation. The older traditions continue to thrive, but the 
work most important to the present discussion responds to the deter-
minist mode in two quite different directions. One response is a so-
phisticated, qualified idealism that restores ideas to a major but not 
exclusive causal position; White is the leading member of this school. 
A second response, a radical approach derived largely from modem 
Marxist thinking, studies ideas, ideology, and consciousness in a ma-
terialist posture. By contrasting these two approaches, I hope to 
make clear my critique of White's work in light of my sympathy for 
the second approach. 
White emphasizes two moving forces of legal history: institu-
tional and doctrinal beliefs of the legal system, and larger cultural 
attitudes and movements in social thought. Institutional norms con-
strain the judge's authority, for example, by requiring judges to fol-
low approved techniques such as formally rational decisionmaking 
and adherence to precedent. Judges filter these role constraints 
through their own social and political inclinations, which by and 
large reflect the social values generated by dominant intellectual pat-
terns. Thus judicial law results from the interaction between ideas 
embodied in the legal system and ideas embodied in the culture. 
An example may be helpful. White rejects the traditional hy-
pothesis that the development of tort law "must be laid at the door of 
the industrial revolution";22 he favors a theory that internal and ex-
ternal intellectual forces raised a new system of law. In White's 
view, the new group of cases was mere context; the true causal forces 
were, internally, the necessity for a doctrinal recasting following the 
collapse of tort law's prior organizing principle (writ pleading) and, 
externally, the scientific, conceptual impulse among legal scholars 
that typified the reigning intellectual class. 
I consider it important that White, perhaps prima inter pares, has 
drawn our attention again to the intellectual history of the law as a 
counterweight to the once prevalent pluralist determinism. How-
ever, because we still are in the early stages of the enterprise, criti-
cism of White's theories is essential. Indeed, White invites such 
criticism: 
22. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 409. The traditional hypothesis has been criticized on 
other grounds. See Tushnet, supra note 20, at 89-91. 
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It seems to me that the relationship between dominant ideas or values 
and "significant" events in the history of a profession is extraordinarily 
complex and difficult to characterize. Events cannot categorically be 
said to skew perceptions of events. Much more work and thought 
needs to be done, in my judgment, before a theory of the interaction of 
ideas and events in· the history of American legal thought can be pro-
posed. [p. 97 .] 
I believe that White's questions are important ones, but the method 
by which he seeks the answers is unpromising. 
White conveys an impression of social conditions as catalysts and 
ideas as powerful, quasi-independent forces moving in history. His 
is not a simple idealism, but it is, I think, idealism of some sort. 
Take again his conclusions in his two principal areas of study. 
White sees American tort law rising out of scientific conceptualism 
and the collapse of the writ system as those two forces converged in 
cases presented by the new industrial system, cases between stran-
gers. But move back a step. What caused the collapse of the writ 
system, and what caused the emergence of conceptualism as a domi-
nant intellectual force? White rejects the view that the writ system 
met its demise because of dissatisfaction with its obscure technicali-
ties and because of the developing codification movement. He sug-
gests instead that a social event, the enlargement of legal concerns in 
the expanding economy, spurred the dissatisfaction, for as writ 
pleading became more flexible and more complex, it also became 
less useful to lawyers as an intellectual organizing device.23 Thus, 
like Ptolemaic astronomy, its complexity contributed to its rejection. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, complexity and an emphasis on dis-
crete rather than general solutions were especially offensive to the 
movement toward scientism. 
Where did that movement originate? Here White leaves us 
somewhat at sea. In the early part of the century, he tells us, Ameri-
can intellectuals held both synthetic and atomistic views of law and 
society, manifested in their acceptance of religious beliefs as an inte-
grating force and in their awareness of the value of individual auton-
omy. After 1850, however, those beliefs were eroded by the 
recognition of the disintegrative and alienating power of material 
progress and the apparent irrelevance of earlier religious beliefs. But 
White explains the emergence of the Victorian ethos no further. 
I suppose a principal reason for White's failure to explore the 
problem fully is the natural limit of the inquiry. Law review editors 
and readers would probably rebel - and rightly so - at an ex-
tended discussion of the origins of Victorianism in an article on tort 
law. Accordingly, White follows the accepted scholarly practice of 
23. Cf. W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 69-87 (1975). 
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incorporation by footnote (p. 168 n.19). But for our purposes the 
analysis must be extended to explicate its theoretical underpinings. 
Before attempting that explication, let me state the second exam-
ple. White describes Sociological Jurisprudence's attack on Mechan-
ical Jurisprudence as the legal front in Progressivism's war on the 
intellectual and political beliefs of the late nineteenth century. Fur-
ther on in the story, as the morality and optimism of Progressivism 
faded in the 1920s, the social sciences and then legal "science" 
shifted their attention, leading to the rise of American Legal Real-
ism. Thus again we are pressed back to explaining the rise and de-
cline of Progressivism. 
These examples share an emphasis on intellectual processes in 
interpreting social phenomena. This is, of course, the essence of in-
tellectual history. Given the sketchiness of the description, we can 
speculate that White is here using one of two possible causal theo-
ries. The first is a determinist mode in which, for example, the chaos 
of an expanding economy leads inexorably to an intellectual attempt 
to organize the chaos according to scientific principles. Yet neither 
White nor many others in the field would be likely to accept that 
approach. In the second, an idealist mode, ideas and congeries of 
belief are largely autonomous from social forces. Industrial capital-
ism does not produce Victorian conceptualism but creates a social 
environment to be understood by intellectuals. In attempting to un-
derstand the environment, they exercise independent powers of rea-
son to revise or replace prior modes of thought. But how would an 
idealist say that a particular new intellectual zeitgeist is finally se-
lected? If we reject determinism, two explanations remain. One is 
that people through reasoning evolve answers that are increasingly 
"correct." As a new situation is presented, they refine earlier ideas 
and beliefs, and their knowledge becomes more sophisticated. This 
position once dominated legal history and is still widely held. But 
given the complexity of historical experience I reject it, as I think 
White would, as inadequate. The other explanation is that the proc-
ess is very complicated and subtle - perhaps incapable of accurate 
definition. At a theoretical level that may very well be true,24 but we 
should not abandon all attempts at understanding just because total 
understanding is beyond our reach. Further insight can be gained by 
contrasting the idealist mode in general with another popular style of 
explanation, materialism. 
There is a crucial but often distorted difference between material-
ism, the mode of analysis unique to Marxism, and economic deter-
minism, which has liberal as well as radical variants.25 Unlike 
economic determinism, materialism acknowledges the influence of 
24._ See R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 8-23, 245-62 (1976). 
25. In the following discussion I make extensive use of Holt, supra note 20; Tushnet, supra 
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intelligence and belief on history. Yet unlike idealism, materialism 
asserts the centrality of economic and social forces in history. 
According to the materialist view of history, people seek to fulfill 
their needs, primary among which are physical needs, by interacting 
with others and developing technology. Collective activity, however, 
is not always harmonious; it sometimes leads to conflict over the use 
and control of the technologically available means of fulfillment 
("means of production"). The relationship of these conflicts to the 
means of production generates social relations ("modes of produc-
tion") in which those in control of the means of production naturally 
prefer to press their advantage at the expense of the subordinate 
group. The members of the oppressed class, in tum, seek to fulfill 
their needs by escaping their oppression. To forestall this possibility, 
the controlling group promotes ideas and beliefs that disguise and 
justify its position ("ideology"). The false ideology appears true as 
an integrated explanation of experience, because experience is pro-
foundly shaped by the mode of production. Ideas, therefore, are not 
excluded from the materialist perception, but the dominance of ·par-
ticular ideas is explained by their service to the social relations of 
domination and subordination.26 
We are thus presented with two sophisticated views of the role of 
ideas in history: qualified idealism and materialism. Both contrast 
with the simplistic views of classical idealism and determinism. 
Neither is susceptible t<? conclusive proof because of the inadequa-
cies of historical evidence and historical method. Nevertheless, I 
would draw certain tentative conclusions, the most important of 
which is that neither can claim to offer a universal explanation. Too 
much time has been spent in recent years defining the relation oflaw 
and legal thought to social forces for us to avoid the conclusion that 
ideas have only limited autonomy. On the other hand, the diversity 
of intellectual experience and the existence of ideas obviously unre-
lated to the mode of production limits the position of materialism to 
at most primacy and not universality. 
I think that the choice between explanatory models is essentially 
a political on~. White's idealist model directs our attention to intel-
lectual processes, to the work of scholars, and to autonomous ideas, 
leaving political and economic forces in the background. This 
model, like earlier idealist approaches, views law as rational activity. 
That view emphasizes the activities of academics, lawyers, and 
judges within the legal system, especially the intellectual aspects of 
note 20; and Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American Law, l MARxlsT PERSPECTIVES 96 
(1978). 
26. In this necessarily brief summary I do not mean to emphasize a conscious, conspirato-
rial element in the production of ideology. See text at notes 30-31 infra. 
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their activity.27 It implicitly holds out the promise oflegal and social 
reform through the power of sweet reason. It deemphasizes the ef-
fects of the conceptual schemes and doctrines on the non-elite con-
sumers of the legal system's products. 
The materialist model, on the other hand, attacks quite directly 
questions of power, of truth, of human fulfillment, and of justice. 
History in this view is not a succession of interesting intellectual 
schema developing against a fuzzy background of social reform 
movements. Instead, it is characterized by an ongoing conflict of 
class against class. The legal system is seen as an arena in which the 
conflict is played out. Sometimes the conflict is obvious, as in a 
struggle over instrumental doctrinal rules. But a major contribution 
of the materialist approach is its insight into the origins and roles of 
aspects of legal thought that, on the surface, do not appear to be 
involved in the class struggle. 
Structures of belief thus play a major role in the model, although 
not a primary role. Some of the most exciting current writing on law 
in the Marxist tradition stresses the hidden power of the intellectual 
constructs that originate in the class conflict. Such constructs should 
not be viewed either in isolation or merely in relation to amorphous 
social movements. They are intimately connected to fundamental 
issues of right raised by the materialist critique. Further, material-
ism considers not only the content of law - doctrines, principles, 
schools of jurisprudence - but also the legal form and legal order 
itself. 
A first use of ideas in law is to build legitimacy for the social 
relations it protects.28 Legal ideology can be used to justify the state 
of affairs in society to the dominated and to the dominating. Hegem-
ony is maintained not by force alone but also by inducing acceptance 
of values and institutions that appear to support an unequal distribu-
tion of power. Ideology will reduce dissatisfaction, or at least overt 
resistance, to the extent that it penetrates the lower class conscious-
ness. The most likely penetration is of general principles, such as the 
neutrality of the legal system, rather than specific rules of law. For 
the dominating class, and especially for lawyers serving the interests 
of that class, legal ideology can reduce the cognitive dissonance that 
arises from participating in a process whose results are manifestly 
inconsistent with basic moral values.29 
Not only substantive legal principles but also the legal form gen-
erates ideology.30 Under capitalism the legal form is homologous to 
27. The choice of the idealist model is also in this way self-justificatory. 
28~ See Holt, supra note 20; Tushnet, supra note 20; Tushnet, supra note 25. 
29. See R COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); 
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979). 
30. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form, 11 L. & Socv. REV. 571 (1977). 
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the commodity form. The commodity form conceals the qualitative 
differences between the exchange values of two products and there-
fore the products' origins in human labor and the relations of capi-
talist and worker. Similarly, the legal form, the notion of impersonal 
equality before the law, conceals the qualitatively different nature of 
individuals who come before the law and the social relations that 
bring them there. Thus the capitalist legal order convincingly substi-
tutes formal equality, liberty, and political community for the genu-
ine, experiential forms of those values, thereby discouraging 
challenges to the existing social order. Autonomy of the legal system 
from direct pressure by political or economic interests does not im-
ply neutrality: a deeper look at the role of ideology in legal history is 
necessary. 
Delineating the connection between the mode of production and 
the ideology of the legal order is perhaps the most difficult task in 
developing a theory of causation. Because legal form and content 
are not always generated consciously by manipulative ruling-class 
ideologues, delineating the connection requires a legal phenomenol-
ogy as part of legal history.31 This approach considers people's at-
tempt to interpret their material and social experience by developing 
integrated theoretical structures. The law's approach to problems re-
flects those attempts and structures. Because economic relations are 
the primary elements of this experience, law corresponds to those 
relations. Thus, consciousness shapes law, but in a sophisticated and 
attenuated fashion with the mode of production as a touchstone. 
While this approach resembles White's in its view of the relation of 
legal ideas to cultural values, it has the advantages of more emphasis 
on the nature of the causal link and a closer relation between law 
and social forces. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Professor White is to be commended for raising the issue of the 
role of ideas in the history of the American legal system. Given the 
ostensible devotion of the system to cerebration, the importance of 
intellectual processes is clear and the attention paid to them is de-
served. Raising issues and resolving them are two different things, 
however. White's work is exceptional but ultimately unsatisfying. 
On intellectual grounds, it fails to consider fully the relation of legal 
ideas to social forces, and the place of ideas in the causal nexus of 
legal history. Such breadth and depth are too much to be demanded 
of any single scholar. On personal grounds, however, it fails to di-
rect attention to issues of justice, the basic issues legal scholars must 
confront. On both grounds, in my judgment, further research will be 
3 I. See Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of' a Method far 
Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REv. 601 (1977) .. 
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more fruitful if it considers the issues raised by the modem adher-
ents of the Marxist tradition. 
